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WEEKLY REPORT



THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

5 January 1966

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(30 December 1965 - 5 January 1966)

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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it
is edited and published by CIA without final coordina-
tion.)

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
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

The tempo and intensity of the war have increased since Christmas. Although there have been no major, prolonged engagements, Viet Cong - initiated activity last week was at a record level, including a sharp rise in the number of armed attacks. The most significant Viet Cong actions have been in Quang Ngai Province, including the over-running of a district capital on 29 December by an estimated regiment. Two allied operations, in Hau Nghia Province west of Saigon and in Phu Yen Province on the central coast, have caused substantial Viet Cong casualties.

The political scene was unusually quiet during the week, although the assassination of a Saigon journalist has aroused some fears of a new Viet Cong terrorist campaign against anti-Communist Vietnamese intellectuals.

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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The political scene in South Vietnam remained unusually quiet during the past week. Government officials reported no further progress in their plans to set up a civilian advisory council, possibly by the advent of the lunar new year (Tet), which extends from 21 to 23 January. The official Vietnamese press agency published an appeal by Premier Ky to Viet Cong troops in connection with the upcoming new year holidays, in which Ky urged them to reflect upon their current plight and return to the government fold. Ky's appeal contained the first public announcement that the government would scatter millions of safe-conduct leaflets over Viet Cong strongholds during Tet. The government plans a major psychological warfare campaign for this period, but it is not yet in high gear.

2. The assassination of a prominent Vietnamese journalist in Saigon on 30 December has reportedly stirred some fears in intellectual circles that the Viet Cong may be embarking on a new phase of terrorism against anti-Communist professional leaders. The journalist, Tu Chung, had been editor of Saigon's most influential vernacular newspaper, Chinh Luan. Chung and the paper's publisher, politician Dang Van Sung, had both recently received threatening letters warning them to cease printing pro-American and anti-Communist editorials.

3. In addition to commentaries deploring Tu Chung's assassination, Saigon papers have recently editorialized on a variety of subjects from the current US peace probes to the need for greater civilian participation in the Vietnamese government. Most of the vernacular press has taken the line that a solution to the war must still be sought on the battlefield. Editorials concerning the domestic political situation ranged from some urging South Vietnam's political parties to come out openly in support of the present government to others impatient for an early return to civilian rule.

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Economic Situation

6. The long-standing power shortage has been greatly alleviated by the addition of 20 megawatts to the Saigon power supply. South Vietnam has had an over-all shortage of 45 megawatts since the Viet Cong sabotage of the Da Nhim power lines some eight months ago. The added power is being generated by a 12.5-megawatt gas-turbine unit at Thu Duc, and by several smaller diesel units. Construction is continuing on the 33-megawatt steam-power unit at Thu Duc, where efforts are also being made to guarantee security in the transformer areas in order to prevent a recurrence in the disruption of the power supply.

7. Having limited its 1966 budget to 55 billion piasters, the GVN is considering various means of increasing tax revenues. The proposed measures include increases in various excise and other tax rates, as well as the shortening of the time lag between incursion of income tax liability and final payment of the tax. The lag is currently from two to three years, during which time the level of tax liability is discussed. The US Mission in Saigon estimates that all of the measures under consideration could raise an additional 3 to 4 billion piasters.

8. During the week ending 27 December retail prices rose slightly, and a combination of unabated demand and delayed arrivals continued to force up prices for imported goods. The exchange rate in the Saigon market dropped slightly to 169 piasters per dollar for dollars, 125 for MPCs (scrip), and 229 for gold. On the other hand, the Hong Kong rate rose to a new high of 162.

9. Included at annex for the first time are three charts of economic indicators for South Vietnam. These reflect a steady and rapid inflationary trend over the past two years. The money supply, for example, rose 70 percent from January 1964 to September 1965 and the cost of living for a Saigon working class family rose 28 percent in the same period. The cost of living--though conservatively stated here--has increased less than the money supply during this period because of the increased use of money in the economy and the willingness of Vietnamese to hold larger cash balances. These

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restraining influences appear to have declined in recent months, and this will increase the inflationary impact of new money created to meet budget deficits. From January 1964 to July 1965, South Vietnam's foreign exchange reserves followed a steady decline; the sharp increase between July and October 1965 is accounted for mainly by piaster purchases for the Special Currency Fund and for US military uses.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The tempo and intensity of the war have increased rapidly since the one-sided Christmas cease-fire, although no significant confrontations have occurred. Viet Cong guerrilla activity achieved a new high and the number of attacks, although predominantly small-scale hit-and-run efforts, also rose sharply. Reactions to Viet Cong attacks on government static installations and lines of communication, and search-and-destroy operations in Communist base areas, have typified friendly offensive activity.

2. During the week of 26 December - 1 January, 1,133 incidents were reported, a sharp rise over the previous week's 861 and the highest total of the war, exceeding the former record figure of 1,038 reached during the 21-27 November period. Three of the 25 reported attacks were estimated to be of battalion or larger size. The kill ratio favored the government, 2.64 to 1, a decline from the previous week's 3.7 to 1. Viet Cong casualties included 897 killed and 127 captured, whereas the previous week's totals were 937 and 137. The government lost 303 killed, 496 wounded, and 189 missing or captured, compared to 227, 499, and 104 for the previous week. US casualties were 34 killed, 116 wounded, and 5 missing or captured, as against the previous period's 21, 95, and 11. Two South Korean soldiers were killed. Government forces lost 431 weapons, but captured only 206.

GVN/Allied Activities

3. Government and allied forces resumed operations after a self imposed 30-hour Christmas cease-fire, which the Viet Cong had disregarded. Of the 75 battalion or larger operations mounted during the 26 December - 1 January period, 37 made enemy contact; the previous week's 70 operations had achieved 42 contacts. Seven of 11 US--and all four of the combined--large-scale operations resulted in contact. A total of 23,309 small-unit operations, including 3,010 US, resulted in 119 contacts with 72 of these made by US elements.

4. Two of the many search-and-destroy operations conducted since Christmas have proved significant.

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MARAUDER, which began with the helilifting of three ARVN Airborne General Reserve battalions into a Viet Cong stronghold in Hau Nghia Province on 31 December, continues with one Australian and two US battalions. The initial landing was opposed by a two-battalion force well entrenched in bunkers with good fields of fire. ARVN losses were 28 killed and 99 wounded. In the continuing operation, following evacuation of the general reserve units, US casualties have been 15 killed and 76 wounded. Viet Cong losses to date are 238 killed (US body count) and 53 captured. Operation JEFFERSON, in which two South Vietnamese Airborne plus two South Korean Marine battalions entered a Viet Cong - infested mountainous jungle area south of Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province, also continues. Latest reported casualty figures are 22 ARVN killed and 27 wounded, 7 ROK killed and 34 wounded, 3 US wounded, and 198 Viet Cong killed (Korean body count) and 9 wounded.

5. Sea, river, and coastal forces searched 3,126 junks and 12,509 persons, a slight increase over the pre-Christmas period's 3,035 and 11,834. None of the 44 persons detained were subsequently confirmed as Viet Cong. Since Christmas, eight B-52 Stratofortress raids have been mounted against target areas in Quang Tri, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong provinces, bringing the total number of such strikes to 140.

Communist Activities

6. Communist activity increased immediately after the partial observance by the Viet Cong of their announced Christmas Eve 12-hour cease-fire. Terrorism increased nearly 40 percent, with 745 incidents for the 26 December - 1 January period as compared to 539 the previous week. The Viet Cong perpetrated the first bombing of a US billet in the resort city of Dalat--long considered safe--on New Year's Eve. The level of Viet Cong terrorist activity against the civilian populace increased, with 61 incidents as compared to 37 last week; 32 civilians were killed, 61 wounded, and 130 kidnapped, with one atrocity reported.

7. Viet Cong activity in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) included eight attacks, one by a force estimated at regimental size. The district town of Minh Long in

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Quang Ngai Province was overrun on 29 December, in the major enemy action of the week; however, outposts north and south of the town withstood the attack. The apparent buildup of forces in the zone continues, with infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into Quang Tri Province reported during the Christmas cease-fire. Several acts of sabotage were committed against bridges on National Route 1 in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai provinces. In Quang Nam Province, a farmer was kidnapped by the Viet Cong, tied to a stake, and burned to death.

8. In II CTZ the number and intensity of Communist-initiated incidents represented a considerable increase after eight weeks of very low activity, although only about 16 percent of the countrywide terrorism total occurred in that zone. Three attacks were reported, including a battalion effort against a regional force company outpost in Quang Duc Province six miles from Cambodia. The attacking force evidently was a composite of Viet Cong Main Force and recently infiltrated North Vietnamese elements.

9. Although none of the seven attacks in III CTZ were of battalion scale, the number and intensity of incidents increased during the week. Outposts in Long An Province, in particular, were targets of frequent harassment, as the Viet Cong attempted to reduce government influence in that area. In the Capital Military Region, following the pre-Christmas flurry of terrorism, the Communist activity rate dropped. A total of 29 incidents, including one attack, was reported, as against last week's 46.

10. The over-all level of Viet Cong activity in IV CTZ has increased significantly. Nearly one third of the countrywide total of terroristic incidents took place in this zone, as did six attacks. Enemy military activity this week included the battalion-size attack on a popular force post in An Xuyen Province on 26 December. Heavy government casualties were inflicted during a Viet Cong company-size attack against a popular force post in Chau Doc Province on 30 December; this attack was reportedly initiated from the direction of the Cambodian border.

11. National Route 1 is closed in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan,

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and Binh Tuy provinces. Route 9 is closed in Quang Tri Province. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Pleiku town. Route 7 is closed in Phu Yen Province. Route 11 is closed in Tuyen Duc Province. Route 20 is closed in Long Khanh and Lam Dong provinces. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces. Provincial Route 10 is closed in Hau Nghia Province. The national railroad is closed between Gia Ray, Long Khanh Province, and Ca Na, Ninh Thuan Province; between Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province, and Hué, Thua Thien Province; and north of Quang Tri, Quang Tri Province.

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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION

1. Pacification budgets for all provinces were approved by 29 December. The only area not covered by a pacification budget by the end of 1965 was the recently created independent city of Cam Ranh in Khanh Hoa Province.

2. The number of Chieu Hoi returnees rose sharply during the past week, according to GVN reports. A total of 705 returnees were tallied as opposed to the previous week's total of 120. By category, there were 246 military, 72 political cadres, 385 civilians, and two draft dodgers/deserters. During the previous week, there were only 35 military defectors, 11 political cadres, and 74 civilians.

3. Preliminary examination of the results of the 1965 Chieu Hoi program shows a marked improvement over the previous year. In 1964, a total of 14,465 persons were counted as Chieu Hoi returnees, and of that number 1,903 were military defectors. For 1965, 42,552 returnees were counted, of whom 10,391 were listed in the military category.

4. Possible reasons for the significant gain during 1965 include a step up in the intensity of the war (such as the B-52 Stratofortress raids that strike heavily against areas once considered secure by the Viet Cong), and an increase and improvement in the use of psychological warfare techniques. Also, with the introduction of larger numbers of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam, including probably a substantial number of poorly motivated conscripts, a greater portion of the Communist military force is now more susceptible to GVN psychological warfare.

5. A group of about 900 Nung refugees are in the process of being moved from the Saigon area to the island of Phu Quoc, about 190 miles southwest of Saigon. The movement is by air and sea, and it is expected that the operation will be finished by the Tet holiday (21-23 January). The Nungs--a tribe of Chinese extraction--are renowned for their fighting qualities and have been generally anti-Communist. Their presence at Phu Quoc may be useful in efforts to improve the security situation on the island.

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
6. During the week, Premier Ky presented titles to state-held lands in Ninh Thuan Province that were formerly owned by French landlords. One hundred and thirty-two farmers occupying 206 hectares of land in the province received titles to their holdings. This is the second parceling out of lands in Ninh Thuan under the current government program of getting land into the hands of those who till the soil.

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NORTH VIETNAM: SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES



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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. Two more surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites-- numbers 62 and 63--have been discovered in North Vietnam.. No missile or missile-associated equipment was photographed at either site. Despite the large number of SAM sites found to date, it is estimated that there is only enough SAM equipment in the DRV to occupy from 15 to 20 sites at any one time.

2. The earlier spate of harshly critical North Vietnamese propaganda and public statements on the current US "peace offensive" was followed up this week by a tough and unyielding Foreign Ministry statement on the "deceitful" US peace moves. The statement, issued on 4 January, was the first official DRV pronouncement on the current peace initiatives. It took note for the first time of the US bombing cessation, admitting that this was intended by the US "as a sign of good will," but adding that in reality it was a "trick" and only temporary. The statement declared, moreover, that the US had no right whatsoever, to demand any concessions from the DRV in return for an end to the air attacks, and called instead for the US to end "permanently and unconditionally its bombings and other war acts" against the DRV as part of the price for "consideration" of a political solution of the war. In addition to the complete termination of attacks on the DRV, the statement reiterated Hanoi's demand that the US must accept the DRV's four points and offer "proof" of this acceptance before there can be any political solution to the conflict.

3. The over-all impression created by the Foreign Ministry statement is that Hanoi is simply uninterested in talks at the present time except on terms completely unacceptable to the US. The statement, together with other DRV pronouncements since the cessation began, also suggests that the DRV is concerned over a possible loss of support for its position in international circles as a result of the new US peace initiatives.

4. Moscow and Peking have also issued a series of propaganda statements sharply criticizing the US peace efforts. Typical of the Chinese propaganda was a 1 January People's Daily editorial that praised Hanoi's

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propaganda statements on the peace issue and claimed that the DRV had "pointedly scuttled" the current US "peace intrigue." People's Daily claimed that the US aim in advocating "unconditional discussions" was to force the Vietnamese people to surrender unconditionally and to accept the "permanent stay" of US troops in Vietnam. To date the Chinese have made no mention of the US cessation of airstrikes.

5. Soviet propaganda has referred to the peace offensive in similarly harsh language. A 1 January Pravda commentary termed the US peace moves a "propagandistic diversionary maneuver." The Soviet press, in commenting on the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, mentioned unfavorably the US suspension of bombings.

6. The North Vietnamese economic delegation--headed by Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, and currently in East Europe--signed two more aid agreements with Communist satellites this week. A joint communiqué issued on 31 December in Berlin announced new agreements on aid between East Germany and the DRV and on goods exchange between the two countries for 1966. On 4 January in Bucharest, the delegation issued a statement announcing the granting by the Rumanian Government of new economic credits to the DRV and the postponement of repayments of earlier credits.

7. On a similar swing through Eastern Europe last June and July, Nghi visited all the major bloc capitals except Bucharest. This year's stop in Rumania pointed up the improvement of relations between the two countries. A main purpose behind the new aid agreements appears to be an effort by Hanoi to demonstrate to the world that there is unity within the bloc on supporting Vietnam.

8. Not only have the North Vietnamese gone out of their way to demonstrate bloc solidarity but they have also made a concerted effort to maintain a balanced position in the Sino-Soviet controversy. This was graphically illustrated this week in a 28 December party daily article that praised Chinese support of the DRV. The timing of the article suggested an effort to mollify any Chinese concern over the recent DRV-Soviet aid agreement and the impending visit of Soviet party secretary Shelepin to Hanoi. This DRV article was followed by Peking's 30 December People's Daily editorial that blasted the

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Soviet Union and seemed to reflect growing Chinese concern that Moscow may be increasing its influence in Hanoi. The Chinese article charged that in calling for "united action" within the Communist bloc on Vietnam, the Soviets are trying to sow dissension and undermine the friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese.

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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. GVN VIEW ON NEGOTIATIONS

1. With the Christmas truce and the pause in airstrikes against North Vietnam focusing attention on the prospect for negotiations, the GVN put its own position on record with an exclusive interview given by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do to UPI on 29 December. Do said that although there was no difference between the US and GVN positions on negotiations and the GVN accepted "unconditional discussions" in an informal setting, the GVN would oppose "unconditional negotiations." Do views discussions as informal exchanges to determine whether negotiations are possible and on what basis they could be conducted, but noted that negotiation at the present time would be like negotiating with a burglar while he was busy looting your house. With regard to a cease-fire, Do added that the Communists would simply use the period to build up their own forces and continue infiltration, feeling free to resume hostilities at a "more favorable" time.

2. Pope Paul and chief of state General Thieu exchanged messages on the occasion of the Christmas truce. The Pope expressed joy at the truce and hoped it would serve as a step toward the establishment of a "just and fraternal peace for all Vietnam." Thieu's reply stressed the South Vietnamese government's and people's desire for peace, particularly for a peace that would not again be threatened. However, he also pointed out that war had been imposed on Vietnam, and that the Vietnamese people accepted it in order to defend their independence and faith in freedom.

B. PHILIPPINES

Foreign Secretary Ramos, making his first foreign policy statement since President Marcos' inauguration, said the Philippines might send token forces to Vietnam for psychological effect. Before his inauguration, Marcos indicated that he favored military assistance to Vietnam if it were in the national interest of the Philippines and if it had the approval of the Philippine legislature, the sixth session of which convenes on 24 January.

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C. POLISH ICC DEFECTOR

Anatol Slavinski, a Polish lieutenant and interpreter attached to the Polish ICC delegation in Saigon, turned himself over to South Vietnamese police on 31 December and asked for political asylum, despite violent physical efforts to stop him by members of the Polish delegation. Bui Diem, special assistant to Premier Ky, told US Embassy officials that Slavinski will be surfaced toward the latter part of the week, probably at a special press conference. Diem said the officer had revealed information about illicit activities by the Polish ICC delegation. The Poles have charged that Slavinski is mentally unbalanced, citing as evidence a recent psychiatric report by the Indian ICC doctor. Moreover, the ICC has sent a letter to the GVN requesting that Slavinski be returned, charging that he is insane and asserting ICC extraterritorial rights. The GVN has conducted its own psychiatric examination, found Slavinski sane, and is so informing the ICC. Slavinski's wishes as to his own future are not clear, though at one point he reportedly stated that he wanted Vietnamese citizenship.

D. CAMBODIA

The Cambodian Government has taken official action pursuant to its 26 December statement condemning the US "decision authorizing American forces in South Vietnam to violate the borders of Cambodia." It has formally requested the British and Soviet cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva accords to take a clear position on this American "decision." According to press reports, the Cambodian Government, in several messages to UN Secretary General Thant, said the US could easily prove its sincerity in regard to Cambodia by giving the ICC in Phnom Penh the material support needed for investigating reports of Viet Cong supply routes and bases in Cambodia. The messages repeated the Cambodian Government's intention--also expressed in the 26 December statement--to take military action against all violations of its frontiers and to possibly appeal to all nations for all forms of aid and support.

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
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
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25 DECEMBER 1 JANUARY


Viet Cong Incidents



Viet Cong Attacks



Weapons Losses




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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

WEEKLY REPORT
25 DECEMBER - 1 JANUARY


Total Personnel Losses

(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)

US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)

	Fatalities	Non-fatal Wounds
Cumulative, 1961-1964	255	1324
Cumulative, 1965 to date	1342	5969
TOTAL	1597	7493

(Figures do not include missing or captured.)

Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GVN/Other Free World)


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SOUTH VIETNAM JANUARY 1965

DECEMBER, 1965


(Killed in Action, Missing in Action, or Captured)



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
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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 December 1965

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Inci- dents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074

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Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	317	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	303	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21153	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
**1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

**Through 31 December 1965

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 December 1965

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total					
Jan	1962	1825	528	0	21	549	839	180	257	--
	1963	927	242	2	8	252	447	49	179	--
	1964	1770	218	3	2	223	1244	129	174	--
	1965	2206	57	1	5	63	1489	272	170	212
Feb	1962	1460	480	0	20	500	613	137	210	--
	1963	788	181	1	13	195	433	69	91	--
	1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	201	271	--
	1965	1982	73	3	6	82	1411	267	91	131
Mar	1962	1961	561	0	27	588	660	290	423	--
	1963	1282	333	0	11	344	653	131	154	--
	1964	2160	198	1	4	203	1632	158	167	--
	1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
Apr	1962	1933	470	0	27	497	1024	220	192	--
	1963	1331	371	3	9	383	688	105	155	--
	1964	2284	211	3	6	220	1738	169	157	--
	1965	1860	38	4	1	43	1407	149	96	165
May	1962	1825	490	0	28	528	892	154	251	--
	1963	1208	344	0	13	357	608	93	150	--
	1964	2143	170	2	3	175	1418	217	140	193
	1965	2263	40	11	7	58	1555	365	115	170
Jun	1962	1477	339	0	23	362	736	157	222	--
	1963	1311	398	1	11	410	652	107	142	--
	1964	2062	128	2	10	140	1390	176	162	194
	1965	2597	82	6	1	69	1784	469	103	172
Jul	1962	1564	437	1	10	448	735	158	223	--
	1963	1368	398	1	8	407	698	80	183	--
	1964	3045	166	7	12	185	2132	286	224	218
	1965	2520	42	6	0	48	1706	400	154	212
Aug	1962	1642	368	0	10	378	885	146	233	--
	1963	1349	356	1	11	368	647	113	221	--
	1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
	1965	2498	38	5	9	52	1597	349	200	300

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small- Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total					
Sep	1962	1375	382	0	9	391	624	178	182	--
	1963	1763	483	3	17	503	889	164	207	--
	1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
	1965	2473	19	5	7	31	1530	278	185	449
Cct	1962	1357	406	1	12	419	583	189	166	--
	1963	1422	359	0	6	365	802	105	150	--
	1964	2827	75	6	2	83	1790	480	197	277
	1965	3330	24	12	8	44	1969	415	198	704
Nov	1962	1311	411	3	7	421	614	144	132	--
	1963	3182	631	3	11	645	1990	269	278	--
	1964	1982	57	1	2	60	1391	247	109	175
	1965	3638	26	10	16	52	2234	486	255	611
Dec	1962	1346	375	1	8	384	670	107	185	--
	1963	1921	258	0	3	261	1298	111	251	--
	1964	2504	81	6	9	96	1719	318	128	243
	1965	4106	32	7	18	57	2572	442	317	718

Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	31529	531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008

Through 31 December 1965


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
Consumer Price Index (For Working Class Family in Saigon) (1959=100)

January 1963 - October 1965




Money Supply (Millions of Piasters)

January 1964 - August 1965



Foreign Exchange Reserves (Millions of US Dollars)

January 1964 - September 1965



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